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 IN
THE INDIA-PAK WAR OF 1971, ON DECEMBER 4, THE KARACHI OIL
TANKS WERE SET ON FIRE BY IAF HUNTERS, AND NOT BY THE INDIAN
NAVY, AS IS COMMONLY BELIEVED, SAYS RANJIT B. RAI
(COMMODORE (RETD) RANJIT B. RAI, former DNO and DNI at NHQ
is an IAF trained Aircraft Controller and author of A Nation
and its Navy at War (Lancers 1987). He is completing The Untold
Stories of the Indo Pak Naval Wars)
"Pak
was in the midst of a war; oil tanks across the harbour were
burning fiercely, but the band played on"
India's armed forces' saw their finest hour in the 1971 war
against Pakistan. Yet history has been singularly unkind to
the Indian Air Force pilots who operated from Jamnagar. Four
IAF Hunter aircraft carried out what was the war's most daring
mission early on December 4, 1971 by setting Karachi's oil
tanks ablaze, but the credit has been inadvertently claimed
by the Indian Navy ever since. While many are familiar with
Admiral S.M. Nanda's brilliantly planned naval foray into
Karachi the same night, the IAF's contribution got side-stepped.
The late Air Chief Marshal P.C. Lal alluded to this strike
in his memoirs, but only in passing. Yet the facts deserve
recalling before amnesia sets in. Even in Indian Navy's commissioned
history, Transition to Triumph, this courageous IAF mission
to Karachi is glossed over by a mere quote from Pakistan Navy's
history: "The oil installations had also been subjected
to an aerial attack earlier in the day (December 4) at 0830,
when two oil tanks at Kemari had caught fire." This writer's
revelation is not meant to ignite an inter-service fire, but
history after 35 years, deserves to be recorded as it was,
without rancour.
At
dusk on December 3, the Pakistan Air Force struck all IAF
airfields on India's western border and caused widespread
damage. The IAF could not respond as its fighters did not
have night capabilities. Just after midnight Mrs Indira Gandhi
broadcast, "The war on Bangladesh has become war on India.
We have no option but to put our country on war footing."
All commanders were ordered to execute their ops orders. During
the pre-war planning, CNS (Chief of Naval Staff) Nanda had
asked Air Chief Lal for a strike on Karachi, but Air HQ staff,
unaware how crucial it was for the Navy, opined that only
after the Badin and Drig Road radars were neutralised by the
MiG-21s from Jamnagar, that a mission to Karachi could be
undertaken from there. Yet in the wee hours of December 4
morning at Jamnagar, OCU head, Wing Commander Don Conquest
and his highly qualified pilots who had recently inducted
Hunters Type 56A and 235 gallon drop tanks, learnt they had
no assigned role for that morning. Conquest approached his
OC, the legendary Air Commodore Pete Wilson, and insisted
that his boys were capable of a strike on Karachi. "What
will our wives and children who have been shunted out from
the base's Bhangi Barracks to Jamnagar town say?" was
his plea. "That we stayed on ground?" Pete Wilson,
who was busy planning and readying the MiG-21s to hit Badin
and Drig Road with first light, let Conquest plan his mission.
Early on December 4 morning, four OCU "Top Guns"
took off for "target Karachi" with road maps. The
Hunters could not carry rockets, as two 235 gallon drop tanks
were slung on the pods, to ensure the reach at low level and
just five minutes over target. Their sole weapon was their
20mm cannons. Wing Cdr Don Conquest, the strike leader, is
now settled in Australia, Squadron Leader S.N. Medhekar his
winger, lives in Pune, Flight Lieutenant P.K. Mukherjee resides
at Salt Lake City in Kolkata and Flight Lieutenant S.K. Gupta
in Delhi. All have recalled their mission many times over.
Don
Conquest recalls. "As per SOP (standard operating procedure)
off Karachi we dipped our noses and fired a few rounds into
the sea to test our guns. Mukherjee's guns had jammed, so
three pressed on at 500 ft along the coast. As we neared Karachi,
the large oil tanks loomed out of the sky, their silver paint
shining in the sunlight. We made two runs without difficulty
and after the first there were huge balls of fire and volumes
of smoke coming out of the storage. As the smoke haze made
flying dangerous we aborted the other runs and flew back."
On landing back at Jamnagar and before he could file reports
and process the films, Conquest was ordered to fly his OCU
to Jaisalmer. Indian Army tanks were under siege. Air HQ was
not made unaware of the damage caused at Karachi till much
later. This is termed the "fog of war." The sight
of the balls of fire from the Naval Academy close by is still
etched in the memory of the Pakistani, UAE and Saudi officers
who took part in a parade later on that fateful morning.
RADM
Khalid Wasay recalls, "I was a lieutenant at the Naval
Academy. On December 4 we were to hold a Passing out Parade
and at about 0830 three aircraft appeared over head and the
next thing we heard was explosions. Later smoke billowed from
the oil tanks. Four days later when we had doused the fires
the tanks were hit again on 8th." Engineer Cdr Iftikar
Ahmed, edu cated at Harcourt Butler in Delhi, recalls how
the IAF planes flew over the Naval Dockyard at Karachi, but
thanks Almighty that they did not bomb the refitted submarine
he was supervising to send to sea.
Rear
Admiral K.M. Alam, captain of the Pakistan Naval Academy,
has this to say in a book by Rear Admiral Zahir Shah: "When
the war with India spread to West Pakistan on December 3,
an air attack on Karachi was expected. But that was the very
morning the Passing out Parade was scheduled in PNS Rahbar.
Commander Riaz, my XO and I, both had our fingers crossed.
The sirens started wailing and an air raid followed. ' The
Ack Ack guns opened up, including those around the Academy.
During the attack one of the oil tanks in nearby Kemari was
hit and burst into flames with a big whoosh! The Academy shook,
some of the windowpanes of the main building were smashed.
Everyone wondered how there could be a parade. I received
a call from Rear Admiral Rashid Ahmad, to say the chief guest
could not make it, and so he would take the salute. I assembled
the cadets and ordered that even if Manora came under attack,
they were to stand perfectly still and rigidly carry out the
drill. There were Saudi and Gulf naval cadets. Avoiding the
conflagration at Kemari - and the ceremonial boat ride - Admiral
Rashid took the circuitous road to Manora. The air raid warning
was on when he arrived. With a look at the empty sky, and
prayers in our hearts, the parade began. The country was in
the midst of a war; oil tanks across the harbour were still
burning fierce ly, but the band played on. The whole show
was conducted meticulously from start to finish." The
oft asked question is why the IAF has never made much of this
amazing achievement. The simple answer is that by December
5 morning, Indian Navy's C-in-C at Mumbai, Vice Admiral S.N.
Kohli had received the code word "Angar," signifying
success of the killer boats in OP Trident, just when BBC reported
the oil tanks at Karachi were on fire. Kohli therefore announced
to the media that the "Killers" had sunk three ships,
later identified as the PNS Khyber, PNS Muhafiz and Venus
Challenger and also claimed the fire on the oil tanks.
Naval
circles have been led to believe through repetition that the
Navy hit the Kemari oil tanks on December 4 night, since INS
Nipat with K 25 Cdr Babru Yadav did launch a single Styx missile
towards the Clifton beach while retreating. This, the commander
of OP Trident, Captain Gopal Rao in INS Kiltan, saw ditching
in to the beach. He has thus been quoted in Triumph to Transition,
though many still contest his version. When this was brought
to the notice of late Air Chief P.C. Lal by Flt Lt P.K. Mukherjee
(later air vice marshal), Lal magnanimously said, "Let
the Navy take the credit..." Don Conquest says that he
is content that he was awarded the Vir Chakra for his role
in the Battle of Longewala, which has been dramatised in a
film titled Border by J.P. Datta. Truth will come to light
only when the official records are released, but Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh is not willing to clear the records yet.
This
revelation in no way detracts from the brilliant and bold
planning by the then CNS, Admiral S.M. Nanda and his staff,
and the superb execution by his commanders and captains at
sea. It was happenstance at Jamnagar that the Navy's request
for a strike on Karachi on the very first morning of the war
came about by the IAF's newest Hunters. It contributed to
the Killers' successful missile attack later that night. Karachi's
defence got geared for air attacks, but the Killers surprised
the Pakistan Navy with the world's first ever ingenious missile
attack. The lesson is that synergy of operations among the
armed forces is their biggest force multiplier. The IAF must
get its due.
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