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 Maj
Gen Harkirat Singh has made a startling statement with vivid
details in his just released book Intervention In Sri Lanka(
Manohar Publishers Rs 545) that in September of 1987 he was
twice ordered by India's High Commissioner in Colombo J N
Dixit to exterminate LTTE leader Pirabakaran when he was to
come for a meeting to his HQ in Palaly. On the second occasion
sited in his book Dixit emphasized that these orders emanated
from Prime Minister and Defence Minister Rajiv Gandhi and
should be carried out. . Since foraying in to Sri Lanka in
July 1987, India was embarrassed by the transient stand taken
by LTTE Supremo Pirabakaran and New Delhi was getting impatient
for results. RAW and in some cases the IB which dealt with
India's Sri Lanka policy and trained the LTTE, changed gears
and was ever ready to discredit the LTTE and chose to support
and arm the ENDLF, to ensure India's interests were safe guarded.
The Army Harkirat claims was not told of this. Had Harkirat
followed the orders the history of the strife in Sri Lanka
may have been different and the Indian Army may not have lost
1100 souls to the LTTE. Thus the serious question 'Did Rajiv
Gandhi order Pirabakaran killed'? needs to be answered and
delved in to by historians.
Maj
Gen Harkirat Singh was the Commander of the Indian Forces
who was hurriedly airlifted by the IAF in to India's war torn
neighbour Sri Lanka on the night of 29/30th July of 1987 with
his 54 Infantry Division and its three rapid reaction Brigades
from Hyderabad, with out the heavy artillery equipment, adequate
ammunition and support arms, specifically for peace keeping.
The troops carried tourist maps and a sketchy Ops order which
was still being finalized in the Army Operations room, extracted
from the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement To Establish Peace and Normalcy
In Sri Lanka. Two days earlier on the evening of 27th July,
LTTE leader Pirabakaran and his entourage were airlifted from
the jungles of Vavuniya by IAF helicopters to Palaly airfield
and seen off by Hardeep Puri of the Indian mission in Sri
Lanka. They were brought to Palam IAF station New Delhi by
a special Avro-748 and Pirabakaran insisted on a stop over
in Madras to meet MG Ramachandran, the then Tamil Nadu AIDMK
Chief Minister which was agreed to by the Government, while
airborne. The IAF maintained excellent communications with
the helicopters and the Avro-748. Captain B K Gupta India's
Defence Adviser in the mission in Colombo accompanied the
entourage and Pirabakaran's aide had asked him to remain close
to Pirabakaran at all times, and warned Gupta that if any
thing untoward happened to Pirabakaran, Gupta's family would
be in jeopardy in Colombo. However MEA Joint Secretary Sahadev
dealing with Sri Lanka in South Block and his deputy took
over in Delhi, and informed Gupta his services were no longer
required. The entourage were housed in Ashoka Hotel and met
PM Rajiv Gandhi on 28th July.
Little
is publicly known or written about the 'one to one discussions'
the two leaders had, but the Punjab insurgency was still breathing
hard, the Bofor gun had started smoking in New Delhi and Rajiv
was under media pressure to come out in the open, with a statement.
A diversion was called for. Late Anton Balasingham and other
writings on the period claim that Pirabakaran was assured
some form of Eelam (Independence) for the Sri Lankan Tamils
in the North East. It is possible some deal was struck with
Pirabakaran by Rajiv Gandhi, whom writers have labeled the
"Young Fox" who was out witted by President Jayawardene
the "Old Fox", by inviting India to solve Sri Lanka's
ethnic problem. Pirabakaran and his team stayed on in Delhi
while Rajiv Gandhi hurriedly proceeded to Colombo.
The Indo Sri Lankan accord was signed on the 29th July itself
between PM Rajiv Gandhi and President J R Jayawardene in Colombo.
A naval Sinhalese rating Vijamuni Vijithua Rohana de Silva
who had lined up in the Sri Lankan guard of honour had attempted
to mortally harm Rajiv Gandhi with the butt of his rifle.
Shri T N Seshan had luckily deflected the blow and Rajiv Gandhi
dexterously ducked. In his voluminous book Assignment Colombo,
late Ambassador J N( Mani) Dixit takes credit for negotiating
and drafting the accord as he had close post prandial 'Brandy
Sharing', relationship and direct access to the wily Jayawardene
and also to Rajiv Gandhi. On that same day the Chairman Chiefs
of Staff Committee Admiral R H Tahiliani was in Moscow, but
the Navy had anticipated troop movements as 54 Div had been
kept on 6 hour notice, and Maj Gen Harkirat Singh was seen
in New Delhi. The Navy kept all operational ships ready at
short notice off Chennai and Vishakaptanam, embark troops.
COAS Gen Krishnaswamy Sundarji was camped in the Army Operations
Room in South Block and directed the operations.
Gen
K Sundarji and his able Military Assistant then Lt Col and
later Lt Gen Shammi Mehta, presently DG of Confederation of
Indian Industries, and Army Staff drafted a longish personal
message from the Chief of Army Staff titled, 'COAS Order of
he Day', to be read out to all troops proceeding from Secunderabad.
In the message the Army Chief reiterated the long and glorious
history of the humane Indian Army in peace keeping, and asked
his troops to treat all especially women with respect, and
bring about peace in war torn Sri Lanka and execute the Accord
to ameliorate the ethnic problem and resultant conflict between
the Tamils and the Sinhalese. Lt Gen Dipender Singh GOC-In-C
Southern Command in Pune was nominated the Overall Force Commander
OFC and late Lt Gen BC Joshi was the DGMO in Delhi who handled
day to day affairs. Naval command was exercised from Vishakapatnam
and Air Force from Trivandrum. This was a cumbersome way to
conduct India's first Joint Operation but no conflict situation
was envisaged.. This writer was witness to the fast moving
events that day. It reminded one of the famous reply which
President Gen Eisenhower is supposed to have made when he
was asked by media in his Oval Office if he had served under
Gen MacArthur in the Phillipines as a Major. Eisenhower replied,
" I do not know if I served under MacArthur, but I was
certainly part of his dramatic team in the Phillipines".
In OP Pawan, many books have been written and all indicate
there was sense of drama in this operation and both Rajiv
Gandhi and Arun Singh took part actively with Gen K Sundarji
and High Commissioner J N Dixit. There were no detailed operational
plans for contingencies drawn up by the staff, and there was
no logistic planning so essential for an out of country operation.
Gen K Sundarji treated the operation like a short term activity
of peace keeping and when he found the going got tough, he
thought he could tame the LTTE boys, with India's military
might. It was not to be . Harkirat's book brings that out
very vividly, as RAW and Sri Lankan leaders played truant.
In the words of Gen Harkirat Singh "We had walked in
with threadbare information, the kind that is available to
tourists. There were no maps available. Finally we obtained
some with help from the Sri Lankan Northern Army Command.
Prior to the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, the Indian
government had given certain assurances of financial and material
assistance to the LTTE. From the time I landed in Sri Lanka,
I constantly reminded the OFC to find out the gist of these
assurances as I was responsible for implementing the Accord
on the ground. And I wanted the immediate nomination of an
agency to monitor the issues specified in the assurances so
that responsibilities were clear-cut. Some time in August
1987, the LTTE gave me to understand that Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi had assured Pirabakaran on 28 July 1987 that India
would make up the amount required to meet the expenses of
his cadres. Also, that the President of Sri Lanka would agree
to the formation of an interim administration. And finally,
that India would protect the interest of the LTTE till their
aspirations were met. But initially, since HQ, OFC did not
know the details of the assurances that Rajiv Gandhi had given
Pirabakaran, we were unable to explain our stance to the LTTE".
This reflects the dilemma of the Army Commander on the ground
in dealing with Pirabakaran who was the unparalleled Leader
of the Tamils in the North and possessed guile. From Harkirat's
book and all writings there is also no doubt that RAW ran
the writ of the India's policy India in Sri Lanka during that
period, as they controlled the funds. RAW operations have
been written about including the details of a senior officer
Kunnikrishnan dealing with Sri Lanka who was befriended by
a CIA planted Pan Am air hostess, who extracted much information
on India's plans. Kunnikrishnan was indicted. In recent days
the funding aspects of RAW have come in to criticism in the
public domain by revelations in two books by B Raman and Maj
Gen V K Singh of the RAW.
In
Harkirat's words on command and control, Dixit said to him
of the LTTE, "General, please ensure that the actions
of the IPKF are in line with my discussions with the Prime
minister at Delhi. You should adopt a posture of gradual change
from negotiations to coercion. The junior commanders during
their contact should ascertain the views of the Tamils on
the above approach". He adds, " The LTTE informed
me that RAW continued to rearm and train 150 militants belonging
to the ENDLF group in the Killinochchi area". Another
critical extract from the book. " The date set for the
meeting to be held at my headquarters at Palaly and chaired
by J. N. Dixit, the Indian High Commissioner, was 16-17 September
1987. On the night of 14/15 September 1987, I received a telephone
call from Dixit, directing me to arrest or shoot Pirabakaran
when he came for the meeting. Telling Dixit that I would get
back to him I placed a call to the OFC. Lt. Gen. Depinder
Singh directed me to tell Dixit that we, as an orthodox Army,
did not shoot people in the back when they were coming for
a meeting under the white flag. I then spoke to Dixit in Colombo
and conveyed the message emphasizing that I would not obey
his directive. I pointed out that the LTTE Supremo had been
invited by the IPKF in order to find a solution to the problem
of the implementation of the Accord. Dixit replied 'He ( Rajiv
Gandhi) has given these instructions to me and the Army should
not drag its feet, and you the GOC, IPKF will be responsible
for it". This order should have come from the Military
Chain of Command and if had been implemented history may have
been different. The Army may have saved 1100 souls and spared
more from being maimed and the debate whether it would have
been ethical can now begin, as Harkirat writes, "It was
probably this incident that led Dixit to reportedly write
to the Government of India on 19 September 1987 that the IPKF
was totally unprepared for the task at hand. He also alleged
that IPKF commanders were showing extraordinary deference
to Pirabakaran 'even saluting him' and finally he stated that
a disastrous situation might develop if GOC 54 Division was
not changed".
Finally
Harkirat explains when the Indian Army went to war with the
LTTE , "On 8 October1987, Gen. Sundarji visited IPKF
Headquarters at Palaly and ordered me to adopt the hard option
against the LTTE. The IPKF from being a peacekeeper had to
suddenly adopt an offensive stance. At this point the area
in which 54 Infantry Division was operating was vast; it was
deployed over some 540 km, from north to south and east to
west in Sri Lanka". Maj Gen Harkirat's book may also
explain why the Indian Army was humiliated, and the LTTE plotted
and killed India's young aspiring leader Rajiv Gandhi, in
whom many Indians had placed great hopes.
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